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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DANA WAGENMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010686-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction entered on a conditional guilty plea to 
possession/use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue presented on appeal has three subparts, all involving the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, and all governed by the same 
standard of appellate review: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Did the trial court properly find that the original trial date of June 4, 
2001, fell within the 120-day detainer period triggered by the filing of defendant's 
request for disposition under Utah's speedy trial statute? 
B. Did the trial court properly determine that "good cause" existed to ^ 
continue the trial in this matter to the next available date because, on the date 
originally set for trial, another matter had priority over the instant case? 
C. Did the trial court properly determine that "good cause" existed to 
continue the trial a second time where the court's unilateral continuance of the first 
setting occasioned the unavailability of the State's key witness on the second setting? * 
The trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute under the 
detainer statute is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peterson. 2002 UT App 
53, f 5,42 P.3d 1258; State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, fl 3-4, 34 P.3d 790, cert. 
denied. 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). This Court reviews the underlying legal conclusions 
i 
for correctness and the factual findings for clear error. Peterson. 2002 UT App 53, f 5; 
Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, fl 3-4. The attribution of delay to a party is a factual 
finding, reviewed for correctness. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, % 4, n.4; State v. A 
Pathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah App. 1993). The determination of the 
existence of "good cause" under the speedy trial statute is a legal conclusion reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911.915 (Utah 1998). 
I 
2 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provision is relevant to the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) (in Add. A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is critical in applying 
Utah's statute on speedy trial rights, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), the relevant dates 
and corresponding undisputed facts are presented as follows:1 
12/26/00 Defendant is arrested and taken into custody (R. 103). She is detained 
without bail in the Utah State Prison pursuant to parole hearings relating to 
her previous parole status (id). 
01/18/01 Defendant signs a "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
Charge(s)" ["disposition notice"] (R. 3) (in Add. B). 
01 /26/01 The information is filed in the Fourth District Court (R. 2-1 ).2 
1/30/01 A summons is issued for defendant's arrest (R. 7,102). 
02/01/01 The authorized agent in the records unit at the prison receives the 
disposition notice (R. 3,102). Add. B. The prison sends copies of the 
notice and additional statutorily-required information to the prosecutor and 
the district court the same day (R. 5-3) (in Add. B). 
lA statement of the facts underlying the charges filed against defendant does not 
appear in this record. Moreover, the facts surrounding the offenses are not relevant to a 
determination of the issue raised on appeal. 
2Because the pleadings file is numbered from back to front in this case, citations to 
the record will reflect the reverse numerical order (i.e., R. 2-1). 
The docket shows that the information was filed January 26 (R. 87). However, the 
court's stamp on the information reflects January 25 (R. 2-1). 
3 
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02/08/01 The district court files the disposition notice (R. 87). 
02/14/01 
03/01/01 
03/07/01 
03/09/01 
03/30/01 
04/13/01 
05/31/01 
06/13/01 
Defendant is served with a summons (R. 6). 
The initial appearance occurs, and counsel is appointed for defendant (R. 
11-10, 102). A waiver hearing is set for 3/9/01 (R. 10, 102).3 
Defense counsel withdraws due to a conflict (R. 16, 85). 
New counsel enters his appearance (R. 18, 85). A waiver hearing occurs 
and a preliminary hearing is set for 3/30/01 (R. 23-21, 85, 102). 
A preliminary hearing occurs at which defendant is represented by an 
associate of her counsel (R. 29-27, 85-84, 102; Br. of Aplt. at 4).4 The 
court finds probable cause on both counts and binds defendant over (id.). 
During the course of the proceedings, defendant requests an additional 
setting before the court so that defendant's counsel of record may be 
present; the trial court grants the request (R. 102; R. 122: 5, 9-10). 
Defendant enters not guilty pleas, and the matter is continued to 4/13/01 so 
that defense counsel may appear (id.). 
Defense counsel appears, and a one-day jury trial is set for June 4, 2001 (R. 
35-30, 102-03). 
The docket reflects that the court sua sponte cancels the jury trial setting 
because of "a high priority case" (R. 83, 101). There is no record evidence 
of any hearing. 
Defense counsel files a motion to withdraw because defendant's family has 
retained private counsel (R. 74). 
06/14/01 The jury trial is rescheduled for June 25, 2001 (R. 76, 101). 
3The trial court explained that a waiver hearing is "a hearing conducted to 
determine whether a preliminary hearing will be conducted" (R. 102). 
4The State's copy of defendant's opening brief was not paginated. For citation 
purposes, the State has added page numbers to the brief, starting with the page containing 
the citation for this Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
4 
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06/19/01 Defendant, through new counsel, files a motion to dismiss the information 
based on an alleged violation of her statutory speedy trial right under Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) (R. 92-77). 
06/20/01 Present counsel for defendant enters his appearance (R. 94). 
06/21/01 The second trial date is cancelled at the State's request because the key 
witness was unavailable on June 25 (R. 122:3; docket at 6). 
06/25/01 A hearing is held on defendant's motion to dismiss, and the court hears oral 
argument (R. 97-95; R. 122: 1-9). The court denies the motion and sets the 
trial for July 25, 2001 (R. 97-95; R. 9-11). 
07/25/01 The trial court enters its written order denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss (R. 103-100) (in Add. D). 
07/25/01 A change of plea hearing is held in lieu of trial (R. 115-13). Defendant 
enters a conditional guilty plea illegal possession/use of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, pursuant to a plea bargain, and the 
remaining misdemeanor count is dismissed (R. 115-04, 2-1).5 Defendant 
requests immediate sentencing, and the court sentences her to an 
indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years, to be served concurrently 
with a sentence she is already serving (R. 115-13). 
08/08/01 Defendant files a timely "Notice of Appeal" (R. 117-16). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Once an incarcerated defendant has properly delivered a written request for 
disposition of charges to custodial authorities at the prison, the prosecutor must bring 
defendant to trial within 120 days or suffer dismissal of the charges identified in the 
disposition request. The time period may be tolled or temporarily waived by defendant or 
extended for "good cause" as determined by the trial court. 
5See State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988). 
5 
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( 
In this case, the trial court held that the original trial setting of June 4, 2001, fell 
within the 120-day period because the period, which would have expired on May 29, was 
extended by fourteen days due to delay attributable to defendant alone. The court then 
ruled that its unilateral rescheduling of the trial to June 25, 2001, was based on "good ( 
cause" under the statute where another case, also set for trial on June 4, was a "higher 
priority" than the instant case. Finally, the trial court held that because the rescheduling 
i 
of the trial from June 4 rendered a key state's witness unavailable, "good cause" existed 
to reschedule the trial a second time to the earliest available date. Defendant 
acknowledges her responsibility for the fourteen-day delay, fails to establish any error in 
the trial court's computation of the statutory period, and does not establish any error in the 
trial court's legal conclusions relating to the "good cause" determinations. Consequently, ^ 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for a 
violation of the speedy trial statute. 
i 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS, FINDING NO VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT < 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by setting the initial trial date outside 
the statutory 120-day period provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), and then 
moving it to an even later date thereafter. Br. of Aplt. at 6-12. First, she argues that the 
statutory period expired on May 29, 2001, making the June 4 trial setting untimely. Id. at 
6 
< 
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7-8, 10. Second, she argues that even if the June 4 setting was valid, there was no "good 
cause" to move the trial date from June 4 to June 25. Id. at 8-12. Finally, she claims that 
the final change in trial dates, from June 25 to July 25, was occasioned solely by the 
prosecutor, was not supported by "good cause," and should not have occurred. Id. 
Section 77-29-1 provides: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the 
state prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and 
there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is 
pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of 
delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the 
demand described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to 
be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt 
requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting 
attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning 
the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection 
(1), the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause 
shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, 
or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his 
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. 
If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, 
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall 
order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
7 
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( 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). Add. A. The purpose of section 77-29-1 is "to 
protect the constitutional right of prisoners to a speedy trial and to prevent those charged 
with enforcement of criminal statutes from holding over the head of a prisoner 
undisposed charges against him." See State v. Truiillo. 656 P.2d 403,404-05 (Utah < 
1982) (citing purpose of predecessor statute); accord State v. Viles. 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 
(Utah 1985) (citing purpose of section 77-29-1 in similar terms); see also State v. Wilson, 
1 
22 Utah 2d 361, 362,453 P.2d 158, 159 (1969) (citing purpose of predecessor statute). 
The burden of complying with the statute rests with the prosecutor. State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d-911, 915 (Utah 1998). Once a prisoner has delivered a disposition 
request, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period." Id Thus, a defendant need not even object to a trial setting ^ 
that falls outside the required time period. Id.; accord State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1991). Instead, the prosecutor must "notify the court that a detainer notice has 
i 
been filed," and he must otherwise "make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. Finally, a finding of "good cause" means: "(1) delay caused by 
the defendant—such as asking for a continuance; or (2) 'a relatively short delay caused by * 
unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial.'" State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 
281,16, 34 P.3d 790 (quoting Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426 (footnote omitted)), cert, denied, 
42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002). 
8 
4 
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A. The June 4 Setting was Within the 120-Dav Statutory Period 
This Court must first determine "'when the 120-day period commenced and when 
it expired.'" State v. Peterson. 2002 UT App 53, f 6,42 P.3d 1258 (quoting Heaton, 958 
P.2d at 916). The expiration date is affected by delays caused by the defendant, which 
toll the running of the 120-day period. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) to (4); Peterson. 
2002 UT App 53,1f 6. 
In this case, defendant concedes that the trial court properly found that the 120-day 
period commenced upon the delivery of the Detainer notice to the prison on February 1, 
2001 (R. 102). Br. of Aplt. at 7. Uninterrupted, the 120-day period would have expired 
on May 29, 2001, as defendant notes. Id at 7-8. However, the trial court properly found 
that the time did not run uninterrupted (R. 122: 9-10) (transcript attached in Add. C). At 
the preliminary hearing on March 30, defendant appeared with someone other than his 
counsel of record (R. 29-27, 85-84, 102). Before the close of the hearing, defendant 
sought and obtained a hearing on April 13 to permit his counsel of record to appear (R. 
29-27, 85-84). At the subsequent hearing, defense counsel simply sought and obtained a 
trial date (R. 35-30). The fourteen-day delay in setting the trial after the preliminary 
hearing was occasioned solely by defendant, and, absent that delay, the trial court 
reasonably would have been able to schedule the trial earlier on its calendar. The trial 
court ruled that this delay tolled the running of the statutory period (R. 122:9-10). Add. C. 
9 
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( 
Defendant admits that this delay "may arguably be attributed" to herself, and that it 
would toll the 120-day period, moving the expiration date to June 11. Br. of Aplt. at 10. 
In actuality, the fourteen-day delay would move the expiration date to June 12 (a calendar 
is attached in Add. E for the Court's convenience). Defendant presents no argument that ^ 
the delay should be attributed to anyone but herself, and does not challenge the trial 
court's finding on this point. Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the 
I 
120-day statutory period expired on June 12, and the June 4 trial setting fell well within 
the time for bringing defendant to trial. See State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, f 49, 37 P.3d 
1073 (appellate court used unchallenged findings as partial support for the validity of the ' 
challenged search), reh'g denied (Jan. 3, 2002). Hence, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to the initial trial . 
setting. 
B. The Continuance to June 25 was Supported by "Good Cause" 
I 
A trial may be set outside the expiration of the statutory time period, provided 
"good cause" exists to excuse the delay. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) to 
(4);Heaton, 958 P.2dat 916. "If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting < 
attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported by good cause, 
whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). Add. A. 
i 
10 
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The jury trial in this case did not occur on June 4, as was initially scheduled, 
because the trial court unilaterally continued this case "to hear State v. Kris Montova, 
case No. 001402774" (R. 101). The record reflects that Montova was "a high priority 
case" which the trial court determined required that it be heard before this case (R. 83; R. 
122: 10-11). Consequently, the trial court held that there was "good cause" under the 
speedy trial statute to continue the trial in this case to the next available date (R. 122: 10-
11). Add.C. 
Defendant contends that there was no "good cause" to continue the trial date 
because Montova should not have been given priority over her case. She claims that 
Montoya was not in custody, as was defendant, that no detainer notice had been filed in 
Montova. as was done here, and that there was no urgency to hear that case in lieu of this 
one. Br. ofAplt. at 8, 10-11. 
However, defendant's assertions have no record support. Instead, they appear to 
be conclusions she has drawn from the court docket in Montova, which'she has appended 
to her brief. However, that docket is not part of the record in this case, and defendant 
makes no request that judicial notice be taken of the docket and no argument establishing 
that judicial notice is appropriate. See Finlavson v. Finlavson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 
App. 1994) (explaining the limited circumstances under which an appellate court will 
take judicial notice of a fact); see also State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 236 n.7 (Utah App. 
1998) (acknowledging, but not exercising, the ability to take judicial notice of facts on 
11 
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< 
appeal), rev'd on other grounds. 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986. Consequently, this Court 
should strike defendant's addendum and refuse to consider the information therein. 
Moreover, the docket does not support defendant's claims. It does not establish 
that no detainer notice was filed with the prison authorities in that case, whether Montoya i 
was incarcerated at the time of trial on June 4, 2001, or whether there was any "urgency" 
requiring that Montoya be given higher priority than this case. Neither does it provide 
i 
insight into the trial judge's reasoning behind his determination that Montoya was a 
higher priority case than this case. There are a myriad of considerations for a judge to 
make in every case, not all of them obvious on the stark pages of a court docket. These 
considerations remain a valuable tool in the administration of justice. See Trujillo, 656 
P.2d at 405 (speculation by the trial judge as to the possible reasons for a change in trial 4 
dates on the morning of trial due to co-defendant's last-minute change of plea support the 
court's determination that "good cause" existed under the speedy trial statute for a 
i 
continuance of the trial beyond the expiration of the statutory period). This trial judge 
was intimately familiar with the procedural and legal posture of both cases, the claims 
made and the rights at issue in each, the age of the respective cases, and the status of the ' 
court's own calendar. With this knowledge, the judge determined that the proper course 
of action was to reschedule this matter twenty-one days later. Nothing in this record . 
reveals this determination to be anything but reasonable and practical under the 
12 
< 
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circumstances. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (extending a timely trial date one month 
beyond the expiration of the statutory period for proper reasons constitutes good cause). 
Further, this court should presume the correctness of the challenged ruling. While 
defendant has no responsibility under section 77-29-1 to ensure a timely trial once she 
properly files her detainer notice, she maintains the burden of providing adequate record 
support for her appellate claims. She has not met this responsibility as she wholly failed 
to create the necessary record below. See State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120, 130-31 (Utah 
App. 1997) (noting defendant's duty to support his appellate allegations with an adequate 
record in order to obtain appellate review); see also State v. Wetzel. 868 P.2d 64, 67 
(Utah 1993). Defendant did not seek any explanation from the trial judge for the priority 
determination and did not give the judge an opportunity to elaborate on its reasoning by 
objecting to the continuance. As defendant failed to create the record necessary to 
support her appellate claim and to permit appellate review, this Court should presume the 
correctness of the proceedings below. See Snyder, 932 P.2d at 130-31 (presuming the 
correctness of the trial court proceedings in the absence of an adequate appellate record). 
Moreover, while the question of whether the prosecutor was responsible for the 
delay is not dispositive of whether "good cause" existed, see Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915, it is 
important to note that the prosecutor had no reasonable opportunity to act to prevent the 
continuance of the initial trial setting in this case. The record is devoid of any mention of 
a hearing, a phone conference, or any other contact between the court and the prosecutor, 
13 
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suggesting that the delay occasioned by the trial court's priority decision occurred without 
any apparent opportunity for the prosecutor or defendant to provide input for or against 
the decision. It was a decision made by the trial court without input from either party. 
Consequently, this is not a situation, as in Heaton, where the prosecutor did "nothing ^ 
whatsoever" to timely bring the case to trial. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. On the contrary, 
the prosecutor had a timely trial date and was prepared to proceed, but was prevented by 
i 
the court from meeting his responsibility under the statute. Once the initial trial date was 
lost, it is not likely that the prosecutor could have had the matter timely set in the eight 
days remaining in the statutory period; defendant makes no contrary assertion. The trial * 
judge noted that he had to push to get such an early second setting, putting the trial only 
thirteen days outside the statutory period (R. 122: 10-11). Add. C. Accordingly, . 
dismissal of the charges as a result of the rescheduling of the trial date at the next 
available setting would be unconscionably harsh on the State and would result in a 
I 
windfall for defendant. 
Q. The Continuance to July 25 was Supported by "Good Cause" 
On June 25, the parties appeared for a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss < 
and for the scheduled jury trial (R. 97-95; R. 122: 1-9). At that time, the prosecutor 
explained to the court that, when told of the new trial date, one of his two key witnesses 
notified him that he was leaving town for a long-planned family vacation out of state and 
would not be available at the June 25 setting (R. 122: 8). Add. C. That witness had been 
14 
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subpoenaed and had arranged his schedule to be available for the June 4 trial setting (id.). 
Consequently, the prosecutor sought a continuance, arguing that the absence of a key 
witness under the circumstances of this case constituted "good cause" under the speedy 
trial statute for a continuance (id). 
Defendant notes that the prosecutor did not subpoena the witness a second time for 
the June 25 trial setting (R. 122: 6). Br. of Aplt. at 8, 11-12. She contends that the 
prosecutor's duty under the speedy trial statute requires that he subpoena his witnesses at 
all costs, and that his failure to do so does not constitute "good cause" because it would 
defeat his "constitutional and statutory speedy trial right." Br. of Aplt. at l l .6 
The trial court acknowledged the absence of a subpoena, but found that "good 
cause" for the continuance still existed under the specific circumstances of this case (R. 
122: 9-11). Add. C. The judge noted that in ninety percent of the cases in which 
subpoenas had not been served on witnesses, "good cause" would likely not be found to 
warrant continuation of a trial (R. 122:11). Add. C. However, under the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, including the earlier delay caused by defendant and the last-
minute moving of the June 4 trial date necessitated by Montova, the judge ruled that the 
defendant's brief contains no constitutional speedy trial right argument. As she 
did not advance such an argument below or on appeal, this Court need only address the 
statutory right. See, e ^ , State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 39 n.l (Utah 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds bv State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 
1108, 1111 n.4 (Utah 1989). Consequently, the State addresses only the statutory speedy 
trial right. 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
absence of an un-subpoenaed key witness constituted "good cause" and warranted the 
granting of a continuance (R. 122: 10-11). Add. C. * 
The trial court's rationale was appropriate. It was not the lack of a subpoena that 
caused the need for a continuance. It was the last-minute rescheduling of the ^ 
trial—without any possibility for input from the prosecutor—that occasioned the witness' 
unavailability. As the prosecutor noted, the witness had long-since scheduled his family's 
i 
vacation around the June 4 trial setting to make himself available to the court and the 
parties on that date (R. 122: 8). Add. C. That setting was made at the hearing on April 
13—nearly two months earlier (R. 35-30,102-03). The last-minute rescheduling of the * 
trial only twenty-one days beyond the first setting—especially during the early summer 
vacation, high-density travel period involved here—provided insufficient time to 
realistically expect the witness to reschedule his family vacation, if at all possible, without 
major difficulty and expense. Continuance to the next available date was entirely 
reasonable and practical under these circumstances. ' 
i 
i 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^day of August, 2002. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
7/ 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 8B 
1999 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 76 and 77 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
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• b T A H DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PgunTMn CHARGE(S) 
TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Notice i s hereby given that I , r^JMy\fl i ^ V ¥ ^ / y Y H / ^ 
(Inmate Name) do hereby request f in^i dispo^jjbion. Charge (s) of 
pending against me in the Ty\J^JIrfr\ (jrefyiC 
brought by* ^Q t b C 
agency e . g . , cou&ty, ' c i t y , 
are now 
pending against e in the \\\^r[w\ t^nJTy\CJT^ Court, 
(prosecuting 
Attorney General, etc. in the State of 
Utah) and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to 
the appropriate authorities together with such information as 
required by law. 
Dated this ffo day of j 7 01 (Month / Year) . 
Inmate's Name QtOL^Ilh^^ USP# ^ffolQ 
* * • * * * * * * • * • • * * * • * • • * • • * • * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * • * * • * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I hereby certify that I ha^ ve
 t received a copy of the foregoing 
notice this 
ve 
]_ day of <AjL^r' Ol (Month / Year) . 
Authorized Ageiit, DIO Record Unit 
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 
-6UCF, PO Doit 000, Ounnioon, Utah Bilfiiia 
(Revised 10/2000) 
w -> (TMF 05/05.06,0 
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1-1 
Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
H. L. Haun 
Executive Director 
Scott V. Carver 
Division Director 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
4 ' » D'STP.i; 
STATE JjTA i 
P.O Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Phone: (801) 576-7470 
FAX: (801)576-7473 
1 February 2001 
FEB evUzuAH'OI 
DIVISION* «? 
Utah County District Attorney 
100 E. Center Street #2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
RE: WAGENMAN, Dana 
USP# 26736 D.O.B. 06/26/72 
YOUR, CASE # UNKNOWN 
Dear Sirs: 
MR/MRS/MS Dana Wagenman is currently incarcerated in the Utah 
State Prison. He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges 
of Illegal possession of control substance, pending in your 
jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process 
his request. 
Thank you for your assistance with this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
Institutional Operations 
1\ rtu.i B utilted, y 
IST: % "TCary Brdckbrac ler 
Reco rds & ID O f f i c e r 
E n c l . (2) 
cc: Fourth District Court Clerk-Provo 
Inmate File 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS 
120-DAY DISPOSITION 
TO: fourth District Court CLerk- Provo 
RE: WAGENMAN, Dana 26736 
Inmate Name USP# 
TERM of COMMITMENT: Poss/use controlled substance 0-5; Dist/arrange 
dist cont substance 0-5/1-15; poss/use controlled substance 0-5; 
distrib/arrangp cont substaince 0-5; Absconding 1 yr; Poss w/ intent 
to distrib controlled substance 1-15/0-5 
TIME SERVED Approx. 03 year(s) 05 mo 
TIME REMAINING: Approx. 11 year(s) 08 mo 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY Scheduled for 00-00-0000 
BOARD OF PARDONS DECISION Scheduled parole expire 00/00/0000 
DECISION Hearing date set for 00/00/0000 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
Institutional Operations 
Authori zed A^ ent., -DIP Record Unit 
Utah State Prison 
P. 0. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020 
cc: file 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANA WAGENMAN, 
Defendant. 
ORIGINAL 
Case No. 011400381 FS 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
June 25, 2001 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT 
Fourth District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiffs Jeffrey R. Buhman 
Utah County Dpty. Atty. 
100 E. Center #2100 
Provo, UT 84606-
Telephone: (801)370-8026 
For the Respondent: Shelden Carter 
CARTER, PHILLIPS & WILKINSON 
3325 N. University Ave. #200 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801)375-9801 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 Utah'fV ^ T^-*-* 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 U O U r t Of Appeals 
FILED
MAR 212002 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on June 25, 2001) 
3 THE COURT: Next is State vs. Dana Wagenman. The 
4 defendant is present. Mr. Carter, good morning, sir. 
5 MR. CARTER: Good morning, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: How you doing? 
7 MR. CARTER: Good. How was the vacation? 
8 THE COURT: It was terrific. 
9 MR. CARTER: Fishing? 
10 THE COURT: No, I took all the kids and we went to 
11 California and played for a few days. 
12 MR. CARTER: You didn't go to Disneyland, did you? 
13 THE COURT: No, sir. 
14 MR. CARTER: Good. 
15 THE COURT: No, I don't need that hectic stuff. We 
16 just played at the beach and played different things*--
17 I MR. CARTER: That sounds good. 
18 THE COURT: We had a good time and now we're ready to 
19 come back to reality. Give me a dose of reality/ Mr. Carter. 
20 MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, I think I should probably 
21 address this one. Your Honor, this was set for trial on June 
22 4th, and I believe that it was June 4th. The Court bumped this 
23 trial for a different trial — I'm not sure which one it was. 
24 S o — 
25 THE COURT: Reset it for today. 
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MR. BUHMAN: Reset it today. My main witness — I 
have two AP&P agents who are my witnesses in this case. My 
main one is Kendall Joy, who is in California at Disneyland on 
vacation with his family. 
THE COURT: I should have found him, Mr. Carter. 
MR. CARTER: Your fault, Judge. 
MR. BUHMAN: The complication in this case is that 
Ms. Wagenman has filed a 120-day disposition, and the June 4th 
trial date actually would have been outside that window but for 
a setting by the defendants awhile ago. So Mr. Carter has 
filed a motion on that, and I don't know if the Court wants to 
just address that. I think the issue is relatively simple, or 
if the Court wants to set it for hearing, whatever the Court 
would like to do. 
THE COURT: Well, I've got his motion. I don't have a 
response from you, a written response. If you do want to file 
a written response you're entitled to do so. 
MR. BUHMAN: I could do that, your Honor, or I could 
just argue it. I think that the issue is really quite clear. 
The law is very simple on this issue. 
THE COURT: Do you want to address it now, gentlemen? 
MR. CARTER: That's fine with us, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Wagenman, why don't you have a seat 
right back there at the table, please. Go ahead. 
MR. CARTER: Judge, this case originates on December 
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27th of 2000. It originates by an arrest by Adult Probation 
and Parole acting as police officers up on this matter by a 
Kendall Joy, who is a probation officer, and I'm advised, a 
Category I police officer. Ms. Wagenman is arrested and she is 
detained. She is brought before the Court the next day. 
She is held there and held in jail pending the county 
filing charges on her. They set it over, I think, for a 
following week to see if those charges are ready to be filed. 
Apparently, by the review of the record, it appears that the 
charges are not — or the county attorney is not ready to 
proceed upon that time. That would place us in the first part 
of January. 
Ms. Wagenman is on parole, and so when the parole 
agency gets a hold of this information, they have a parole 
hearing and they take her back to prison. She has been there 
since that time. 
On January 18th of 2001 Ms. Wagenman issues a 120-day 
disposition. That's received by the prison. I think that's 
noted as being received on February 1, 2001. That same day the 
prison sends out notification to the county attorney's office 
of this 120-day disposition. There's also a document within 
the file suggesting that that was sent on February 1st, and 
maybe it was received somewhere around that date. 
As I reviewed the record, it appears that the case was 
finally filed by the county attorneys on January 26, 2001. A 
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hearing date was then set for 2001 in where she was appointed 
attorney. A waiver hearing occurred on March 9th, preliminary 
hearing then was scheduled for March 30th. 
Apparently Mr. Bainum was appointed to represent 
Ms. Wagenman. There was another gentleman by the name of 
David Facemeyer who pinch hit or substituted for Mr. Bainum at 
the preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing was 
conducted. At the conclusion of that the case is apparently 
continued to April 13th so counsel can be present. I'm 
assuming that refers to Mr. Bainum. 
So at that point the matter is set on for April 13th. 
From the hearing of April 13th, the Court set the jury trial 
for June 4th. Apparently there was another case where I think 
the Court record indicates of a higher priority that was 
actually heard, and I don't know what that one was about* 
Then that trial was scheduled for June 25, and here we 
are today. Last week while the Court was — your Honor was on 
vacation there was some discussions ongoing between Mr. Buhman 
and I, and I think Mr. Buhman decided to call Kari, the court 
clerk, and advise her that we did not need a jury on this 
because they were not ready to proceed because, I think, last 
week Mr. Buhman learned that Mr. Joy was out of town and 
basically unavailable. 
We think at this point, by the way we calculate it, 
April 13th is the date — excuse me, May 18th would have been 
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the date that this case would have been required to appear. I 
don't know how the Court wants to deal with the March 30th 
date, moving that to April 13th, but even if you do take that 
into consideration, we're way beyond the 120 days at this 
point. We think our motion is well made. 
THE COURT: Mr. Buhman, tell me, was your witness 
subpoenaed for the trial? 
MR. BUHMAN: Well, we've been in contact with him, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Not subpoenaed? 
MR. BUHMAN: We didn't issue a subpoena because he 
notified us that it was a long planned vacation with his 
family, so we didn't it was (inaudible) issue a subpoena. May 
I approach? 
MR. CARTER: I think I've included that in my motion. 
MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, this one— 
MR. CARTER: Actually, I think that's in the file. 
MR. BUHMAN: Yeah, this one has an eligible date on 
it. May I approach? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, on the bottom left corner it 
shows the date that this was delivered to the prison. I think 
the statute is quite clear the pertinent date for beginning the 
120 days is the date of delivery (inaudible) the prison had 
custody of the prisoner. 
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1 MR. CARTER: Judge, we don't contest that. I think 
2 that's correct. 
3 MR. BUHMAN: So it's the 29th of January. I looked on 
4 a calendar, and even with months ending in 28, 29, 30 or 31 
5 days, I do believe that the correct ending date would be May 
6 29th from this date. So the June 4th date would have been 
7 outside that 120 days, except that at the preliminary hearing 
8 on March 30th, as Mr. Carter mentioned, Ms. Wagenman was 
9 represented by David Facemeyer, who was not her appointed 
10 attorney. 
11 At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing the Court 
12 bound that over, and Mr. Facemeyer requested additional time to 
13 have Mr. Bainum present. So that's a defense motion to set the 
14 trial down. We were prepared and indicated we were prepared to 
15 set the trial date at that time. 
16 I So the law is clear that if the defense makes a motion 
17 I to continue or the defense causes a delay, that runs against 
18 the defendant and not against the State. So those 13 days — 
19 maybe that's 14 days. There's 31 days in March, so 14 days 
20 would toll against the defendant. So the June 4th trial date 
21 would have been within the 120 days. 
22 On the June 4th trial date the Court bumped the 
23 matter. If the Court has good cause or the prosecution has 
24 good cause, depending on what the Court decides, then the Court 
25 can extend the 120 days or at any time and not toll against the 
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State. 
So the Court bumping our June 4th, and today we're 
requesting a continuance which we believe for good cause. We 
have a witness who was available on June 4th. He was 
subpoenaed. We had spoken to him and he was ready to go. So 
we were ready to go on June 4th. The Court set it on the 25th, 
which at that time I did not know was not a good day for 
Mr. Joy, but he indicated to us on the phone that he was unable 
to attend today, as I've mentioned, for a long planned 
vacation. 
So we believe that the 13 days should toll against the 
defendant, and there has been good cause for the Court to 
continue the trial on the 4th and good cause today. So we 
think we should be within the 120 days still. 
MR. CARTER: I think one of the real failures here is 
the State didn't subpoena their witness, and Mr. Joy is out of 
town. That, I think, works against the State pretty 
dramatically. My position on it is is this is not a citizen 
witness. This is a (inaudible) employee of the State who has 
chosen to prioritize a vacation over the speedy rights of the 
defendant. 
If that was the case, we should have had a more 
informal motion to continue and then learning of it at the late 
date, and here we are today, and I would like the record to be 
clear that we are not the ones that deferred this hearing from 
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a jury trial today. It is the State's request because Mr. Joy, 
not being subpoenaed and not being here. 
MR. BUHMAN: May I respond to that, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BUHMAN: I'm unaware of any case law that says I 
have to issue a subpoena before I can get a good cause for 
continuance. I don't believe there's any case law that 
supports that. I think that all I have to show is that there 
is good cause to continue the trial. There is no (inaudible) 
rule that I have to issue a subpoena to require someone to be 
here when they have long standing plans. 
We inconvenienced Mr. Joy, he didn't do it to us. He 
had scheduled vacation at a time when he would have been 
available for the trial. So it's essentially the State's fault 
or the judicial system's fault that we set it on a date when 
he's unavailable. I don't think that should be held against 
the State. These are people — these are real people that we 
deal with in these courtrooios, and they have lives and families 
as well. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. CARTER: No. 
THE COURT: Having looked at your motion, Mr. Carter, 
and now hearing from counsel, I'm going to find as follows. 
The motion to dismiss is denied for the following reasons: I 
believe that Mr. Buhman has correctly stated the sequence of 
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events with respect to the creation of the extension of time 
beyond May 29th, i.e., the request on behalf of Ms. Wagenman's 
former counsel for a hearing that was at counsel's request — 
it wasn't at the State's and it wasn't at mine — to continue 
it from the date that — to the date that counsel wanted it 
continued. That extended it beyond — the 13 days extended it 
beyond the 29th of May. 
In addition, I find that there — that although I 
would like to have seen subpoenas, and although I think your 
argument in most instances is probably well taken, it — if we 
had people that are supposed to be here for hearings and don't 
show up, Mr. Carter, that's one of the very first things I look 
for in the file — I guess it's just my toilet training — is 
whether or not people have been subpoenaed. So the State ought 
to factor that in in what they do with respect to witnesses. 
In this instance, however, because of request of 
counsel and the other case being continued for good cause — 
the other trial date being continued for good cause because of 
the other case, June 14th is the day on which this case was set 
for trial. 
MR. CARTER: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: That's when the notice went out of the 
trial date, the 14th of June. It was June 4th. That had to be 
continued. June 14th a new notice was sent of today's date. 
So you had to push that 20 days pretty fast to be able to get 
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things on for you, and I find that because of the shortness of 
time and the realistic potential of a major conflict with 
people's schedules this time of the year, that there is good 
cause demonstrated for the absence of the witness for the 
purpose of a trial today. 
That probably wouldn't hold in 90 percent of the 
situations without subpoenas. But where I considered all of 
the factors, the totality of everything, and looking a": times 
and dates, that is — those are my conclusions with respect to 
the time frames that evolved in this case, the posture that 
brings us to where we are today. So we'll set it for trial. 
MR. CARTER: Judge, I don't have my calendar with me. 
Do you mind if I make a phone call to the office just a second? 
THE COURT: I don't. 
MR. CARTER: What days are you looking at? 
COURT CLERK: July 25th. 
MR. CARTER: July 25th? That's today. Oh, I mean 
July 25th, I'm sorry. 
(Mr. Carter calls office to check calendar) 
MR. CARTER: That will work, Judge. 
THE COURT: 7/25, 8:30. Any requested voir dire or 
instructions you want me to consider, please file them by July 
16th. 
MR. BUHMAN: Your Honor, just to make sure that you 
have my instructions. I think I filed them. 
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THE COURT: They're here. Let me just take a look 
again. They're here. Anything else, gentlemen, on behalf of 
Ms. Wagenman? 
MR. CARTER: No, your Honor. 
MR. BUHMAN: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you very much. 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic tape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 31st day of 
January 2002. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
rfUBLIC 
residing in Utah County 
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FILED 7M/*' 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah Co'inty. P»«*te of Utah 
L V I L U ^ „ . O^PUty 
SHELDEN CARTER (0»9) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
, -oooOooo-
STATEOFUTAH ) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER DENYING MOTION 
) TO DISMISS 
) (120-Day Disposition) 
vs. ) 
) CaseNo. 01140381 
Dayna Wagenman, ) 
Defendant. ) 
-oooOooo- ' 
Defendant, Dayna Wageman, through counsel, motioned this Court to 
dismiss the information filed herein against said defendant. The motion was 
made pursuant to and under the authority of U.C.A. 77-29-1, U.C.A. 
Defendant Wagenman was being detained in the Utah State Prison prior 
to January 18,2001. She was initially arrested on December 26,2000 and placed 
in custody. She was on parole and pursuant to parole hearings she was detained 
without bail in the Utah State Prison. 
; .% o 
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Said defendant caused on the date of January 18, 2001, to have served a 
120-day disposition for Utah County referencing this pending charge. It was 
noted as being received by the Utah State Prison on February 1,2001. It was 
mailed to the Utah County Attorney on the same date of February 1,2001. The 
notice of the 120-Day Disposition was forwarded to the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on February 1,2001. 
The case originates as a result of her arrest on these accusations on 
December 26, 2000. She was held in the Utah County Jail for a period of 
approximately one week awaiting initial arraignment in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court without bail. The Utah County Attorney was not prepared to 
proceed at this time. However, the Utah State Department of Corrections placed 
a parole hold upon her. The Utah County Attorney office officially filed the 
information accusing the defendant of such criminal conduct on January 26, 2001. 
A summons was issued on January 30, 2001. A hearing date was set for March 1, 
2001. On said date, an attorney was appointed to represent the defendant. A 
copy of the information was given to the defendant on said date. Mr. Craig 
Bainum ws appointed to represent her. 
A waiver hearing (a hearing conducted to determine whether a 
preliminary hearing will be conducted) was set for March 9,2001. A 
preliminary hearing was scheduled for March 30,2001. The hearing was 
conducted on March 30,2001. Mr. Dana Facemeyer, an attorney working with 
Mr. Bainum, appeared for her in substitution for Mr. Bainum. Further 
proceedings were then scheduled for April 13, 2001 to allow Mr. Bainum to be 
present. At said hearing, a jury trial was then scheduled for June 4, 2001. On 
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June 4, 2001, the trial was continued for another case. The Court continued the 
trial on June 4, 2001 from said date to hear State v. Kris Montoya, case No. 
001402774. See the docket of Ms Montoya case. 
The Wagenman trial was then rescheduled for June 25,2001. 
On June 25,2001, the defendant appeared ready for trial. The State sought 
a continuance of the trial on said date. The State's motion was based on the fact 
that they had not subpoened witnesses to the trial and that the critical witness 
(probation officer Kendall Joy) was out-of-state vacationing. The Court granted 
the State's motion to continue the June 25,2001 date. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing on this ^ ffiflay of July, 2001, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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